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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANCIS F. LUND, JACK L. STARKS, 
DONNEL ROBERT GWYNN, NORRIS 
H. MARSHALL, EILHU MILLER, CLEO 
S. KING, ROYCE W. MOON, JAMES 
ALBERT FERGUSON, THEODORE R. 
ATHA, FRED JOHNSON and A. V. 
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PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, 
Inc., Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
9119 
Brief of Plaintiffs and Respondents 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because it appears to the plaintiffs and respondents that 
the appellant has failed to accurately state the facts, respond-
ents desire to restate the facts involved in this particular appeal. 
Mrs. Donnell Gwynn, wife of one of the respondents 
herein, testified that at about 4:10 o'clock p.m., June 17, 1958, 
she drove the family car to appellant's Woods Cross, Utah, 
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refinery to pick her husband up from work. Slie parked on 
Eighth West Street just north of Fifth South, stopping the 
car pointing north on the west shoulder of the street (R. 79). 
On her left was . a parking lot owned by appellant. In the 
middle of the parking lot, on its north side, was a flare stack 
owned and operated solely by appellant (R. 118) of the kind 
ordinarily found at refineries and used to burn off excess gases. 
She remained parked there waiting for her husband until he 
came out to meet her at about 4:25 to 4:30 p.m. (R. 81). 
After she had been waiting for about five minutes, she noticed 
soot settling on the car. The shoulder of the road where she 
was parked slanted down toward the west where the flare was 
located. The soot landed mostly on the hood, top and wind-
shield of the car (R. 81) . The wind at this time was blowing 
toward the east and she saw that the flame, smoke and soot 
from the flare stack were blowing directly at her (R. 80). 
The particles of soot were slightly smaller than a matchhead 
(R. 85). She could not trace individual bits of soot all the way 
back to the flare, which was about 300 feet west of her (R. 183) 
but she said the soot looked thickest, coming from the smoke 
at the end of the flame (R. 87, 88). She saw no other smoke 
in the area (R. 91, 92). 
Donnell Gwynn testified that he noticed the soot as soon 
as he got to his car (R. 97), that it remained on the car 
until he washed it the following night, blistered the paint 
and pitted the glass (R. 98). The damage was located 
under the particles of soot and had a slight discoloring effect 
on his windshield (R. 114). There was a light concentration 
of spots on his car, but none on the east side of the car which 
had faced away from the flare stack (R. 102). 
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He had lived in the area for seventeen years (R. 92), and 
stated that to the west and northwest of the parking lot, 
other than appellant's own installations, the land is farm land, 
gun clubs and Great Salt Lake (R. 97). A railroad runs one 
quarter of a mile west of the parking lot and another railroad 
runs east of the parking lot (R. 104). Southeast of the parking 
lot is the. Hatch Trucking Co. (R. 93, 104), a railroad depot 
(R. 103, 104) and two streets (R. 80). Respondents were 
on appellant's lot as business invitees (R. 28, 41). 
Respondents' automobiles parked closest to the flare re-
ceived the most soot (R. 127, 128). The soot landed on the 
parts of the respondents' automobiles which faced the flare 
(R. 102, 106, 127, 128, 131, 135, 136). The wind was blowing 
steadily from the west (R. 80, 116, 124), as stipulated to by 
appellants (R. 117). Respondents' automobiles were down-
wind-east and southeast-of the flare stack (P. Ex. 6). Auto-
mobiles in the same parking lot, as close to the flare as re-
spondents' automobiles but west-upwind- of the flare, were 
not damaged (P. Ex. 6, R. 120-122). The soot damaged 
respondents' automobiles (R. 97-99, 107, 110, 111, 114). 
Downwind were the Hatch Trucking Company (R. 93, 
104), the railroad depot (R. 103, 104, 144, 145) and nearby 
streets (R. 80). 
The possible upwind sources mentioned above were very 
remote in distance and not of a type likely to produce corrosives. 
All were at least one quarter mile west of the· parking lot and 
soot from them would have damaged the automobiles west 
of the flare. No smoke was seen other than appellant's (R. 91, 
92) and no trains were heard (R. 119). The railroad west 
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of the parking Jot was used by diesel locomotives only and they 
are smokeless on level ground (R. 119). 
Two farmers-Mr. Winegar and Mr. Hatch-testified 
that in 1957 their crops north of appellant's north plant were 
"burned" by a substance that appellant later chemically anal-
yzed, that appellant paid them for the damage and that the 
substance apparently came from appellant's north plant (R. 
227-231 ). 
Appellant's evidence attempted to show that appellant 
had no known substance on its premises that could cause the 
subject damage and that appellant had adequate safety devices:, 
however: 
(a) Appellant had not inspected the flare or the system 
leading to the flare since the installation of its settling tank 
in 1957 (R. 183-185). 
(b) Appellant gave evidence only as to the precautions 
taken in its south plant. Mr. Kenney, appellant's safety engi-
neer (R. 140), testified in answer to a question as to what 
units used the flare, "· ... 1, 2 and 3 process units are tied 
into this particular flare" (R. 145), and that these units were 
in a triangular area bordered by Fifth South St., Eighth West 
St., and the Union Pacific Railroad (R. 144, 145, 162). He 
repeated that these were the only units using the flare (R. 162, 
223). 
Mr. Yeates, appellant's operations superintendent, testified 
that appellant's north plant also used the subject flare on June 
17, 1958 (R. 247-248). Appellant gave no testimony as to 
safety precautions in this north plant, nor as to whether north 
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plant operations were normal on that day, and also did not 
discuss possible corrosives used or processe~ in the north plant. 
(c) The south plant processed the light petroleum prod-
ucts such as butane and home fuel gas (R. 150, 164-166). 
The north plant refined the heavy petroleum products 
after they were separated, without refining, from the light 
products in unit 1 of the south plant (R. 150, 217, 218). 
(d) Dr. Sugihara, called as an expert witness by appel-
lant in regard to the chemical content of petroleum, testified 
only as to the chemical contents of appellant's units 1, 2 and 
3 (R. 172), had never inspected appellant's premises (R. 175), 
and conceded that petroleum contains "many, many millions 
of compounds" (R. 177). 
(e) Appellant introduced evidence that there were sta-
tionary metal and painted surfaces east of the flare stack 
(R. 198, 199, 204, 205). There was no testimony as to whether 
or not these surfaces were damaged by the soot. 
(f) Appellant, after receiving complaints by respondents, 
made only a check of the bottom of its settling tank (R. 195). 
This was two days after the damage to respondents' auto-
mobiles (R. 192). Appellant did not check the flare stack 
(R. 184, 185). 1-fr. Kenney tested the material he drew from 
the settling tank by burning it and collecting the soot produced 
on a truck tail gate (R. 192, 193). This soot was in such 
fine particles that it appeared to be a film (R. 195). This is 
the appearance of soot ordinarily released from the flare (R. 
148, 149), and different from the matchhead-sized particles 
on respondents' automobiles (R. 85). Respondents were on 
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appellant's premises before and after June 17, 1958, and 
received damage only on that day (R. 93, 102). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS' AUTOMO-
BILES WERE DAMAGED BY SOOT EMITTED FROM 
APPELLANT'S FLARE STACK IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
The case is at law, not equity. Appellant's appeal is on 
law only (Rule 71 U.R.C.P.). As a matter of law, a jury 
finding of fact may be set aside only if clearly against the 
weight of the evidence and not supported by any substantial 
evidence. Dairy Distributors v. Local Union 976, etc., 8 U2d 
124, 127, 329 P2d 414; Morley v. Rodberg, 7 U2d 299, 300, 
323 P2d 717. 
Respondents gave competent evidence on the following 
points: 
(a) The soot damaged respondents' automobiles (R. 
97-99, 107, 110, 111, 114). 
(b) The soot appeared to Mrs. Donnell Gwynn-an eye 
witness-to come directly and solely from appellants' flare 
stack (R. 80, 84, 87, 88, 90). 
(c) The small size of the soot particles made it impossible 
for the eye to positively trace each particle back to the flare, 
yet there is no plausible explanation of how the soot could 
come from any other source and ( 1) still hit only the parts 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of respondents' automobiles facing the flare (R. 102, 127, 
128, 131, 135, 136); skip the cars equally close to the flare, 
but upwind of it (P. Ex. 6, R. 120-122); and (3) be most 
concentrated on the respondents' automobiles closest to the 
flare (R. 127, 128). 
Appellant's rebuttal rested on the points that its operation 
could not have produced a substance capable of doing the 
damage complained of, and that there were other possible 
sources of the damage. Appellant's proof was not so persuasive 
on these points that the jury, as a matter of law, was not 
justified in finding that soot from appellant's flare caused the 
damage, for the following reasons: 
(a) In regard to other possible sources, the wind was 
blowing only from the west (R. 80, 116, 124-126). Appellants 
stipulated without reservation on this point (R. 117). The 
wind direction automatically eliminated possible sources not 
west of respondents' automobiles. The railroad depot and tracks 
(R. 103, 104, 144, 145), the Hatch Trucking Co. (R. 93, 
104), Eighth West Street (also called "Onion Street" at R. 95, 
144) and Fifth South Street (R. 79, 80) were all east or south-
east of the parking lot. 
To the west or northwest there was no industry other 
than appellant's own works (R. 95, 96), farmland, gun clubs, 
Great Salt Lake (R. 95-97), a railroad one quarter of a mile 
to the west (R. 103) and a dump two miles northwest (R. 
112). No smoke was seen by Mrs. Gwynn other than that 
from appellant's flare (R. 91, 92). The railroad to the west 
was used only by diesel trains that produce smoke only on 
steep grades. No passing train was heard (R. 119). 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 is not disputed as to accuracy and 
can be explained only on the basis of a source of soot within 
the parking lot, approximately where appellant's flare was 
located. 
The evidence fails to give any probative weight to a source 
of a corrosive soot outside of appellant's subject parking lot. 
(b) Appellant's testimony that corrosive soot could not 
have come from its flare stack is not conclusive. 
Appellant introduced testimony that there were stationary 
metal and painted surfaces near to and east of the flare (R. 
198, 199, 204, 205). It gave no testimony as to what effect 
the soot had on these surfaces. 
Prior similar damage occurred adjacent to appellant's 
Woods Cross plant for which appellant assumed responsi-
bility (R. 227-231). 
Appellant's check of its system leading to the flare stack 
was made on June 19, 1958, two days after the release of 
the corrosive soot (R. 192). Respondents admit that the 
corrosive soot was released on only one occasion (R. 93, 102). 
The inspection consisted solely in drawing liquid from the 
bottom of the settling tank (R. 195), which presumably was 
the heavier material in the flare system, did not include a 
check for solid or light sediment and did not include an examina-
tion of the inside of the settling tank (R. 202) nor of the flare 
stack (R. 184, 185). The soot produced when this liquid 
was burned was in grains so fine as to be a film (R. 195). 
The soot on respondents· automobiles was in particles slightly 
smaller than the head of a match (R. 85). The soot ordinarily 
10 
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produced by the flare was in such fine particles as to be a film 
(R. 148, 149). The soot that landed on respondents' cars was 
very light in weight (R. 186). These factors suggest that 
the corrosive material might have passed out of the flare 
system before appellant tested the system, or that appellant's 
check was not thorough enough to discover it, because the 
material that appellant tested had the characteristics of the 
material ordinarily in the system. 
Mr. Kenney testified that only appellant's south plant 
was connected to the flare (R. 144, 145, 161, 162). It processed 
different material from appellant's north plant (R. 151, 152, 
163-165, 188, 217, 218). The south plant processed the light 
petroleum products and the north plant processed the heavier 
petroleum products (R. 188, 217, 218). Appellant introduced 
testimony in regard to the safety systems in use in the south 
plant. (See all of testimony of Mr. Kenney and Mr. Yeates) . 
It produced no testimony as to the safety procedures in the 
north plant, nor as to corrosives in the north plant. There was 
no attempt made to show if the north plant had normal opera-
tions on June 17, 1958. The north plant, however, on June 17, 
1958, was using the subject flare stack to vent its excess gases, 
because on that day it was the only operating flare stack on 
appellant's premises (R. 217, 218, 223, 224). It should be 
noted that the similar, prior damage occurred by the north 
plant, and was attributed to the north plant (R. 228, 230). 
Doctor Sugihara, called as a chemical expert by appellant, 
gave academic testimony as to the content of petroleum, but 
had never inspected appellant's actual operations (R. 175, 
176). He stated in regard to the components of petroleum 
11 
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that it contains " ... many, many millions of compounds" 
(R. 177). 
From the foregoing it appears that the jury could reason-
ably have found that the soot caused the damage, and that it 
came from appellant's flare stack. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA 
LOQUITOR WAS PROPER. 
"In order to invoke this doctrine (res ipsa loquitor) it 
is generally recognized that the following elements must be 
present: ( 1) That the accident was of a kind which, in the 
ordinary course of events, would not have happened had due 
care been observed; (2) That it happened irrespective of any 
participation by the plaintiff; and ( 3) That the cause thereof 
was something under the management or control of the de-
fendant, or for which it is responsible." Weightman v. Moun-
tain Fuel Supply Co., 8 U2d 373, 302, P2d 471. 472. The 
function of the doctrine is to create an inference of negligence 
when circumstantial evidence fairly tends to prove the above 
elements, and the plaintiff as a practical matter has no way of 
proving the specific acts of negligence causing the injury of 
which he complains. Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp._. 
9 U2d 275; 342 P2d 1094. 
The requirement that the accident be one that would not 
ordinarily happen if due care had been used is a factual re-
quirement. The question posed to the jury by the evidence 
12 
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was: Are corrosive substances capable of blistering paint and 
damaging glass ordinarily found floating in the air as natural 
materials in the form of soot, and if not are such sub-
stances ordinarily released deliberately or through negli-
gence? Determination of this factual issue is 4 matter for 
the jury to consider in the light of the evidence, common sense 
and practical experience. White v. Pinney, 99 U 484, 108 
P2d 249, 254. The jury could consider the reasonable matters 
that a person controlling such a potent substance would and 
should usually try to keep it confined, Klenk v. Oregon Short 
Line R. R. Co., 27 U 428, 76 P. 214, and that the substance 
was in the form of a soot, indicating that it had been subject 
to mechanical processing and was not a mere product of nature 
as, for example, dust might be. 
The jury found in its special verdict, as a separate and 
specific finding, that the soot came from appellant's flare stack 
(R. 46). Appellant conceded sole control and operation of 
the flare stack (R. 118). This is conclusive of the element of 
control and causation by appellant. The weight of the evidence 
to support the jury's finding on this element is covered under 
Point I and III. 
Respondents' only act was to park their automobiles in 
a parking lot on appellant's property which was designated 
for this use by appellant (R. 103). No active participation on 
respondent's part is shown in the record. 
It is submitted that the evidence amply justifies the use 
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor. 
13 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT III 
THE JURY'S FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS 
NEGLIGENT WAS PROPER. 
The owner of property has a duty to protect the safety 
of a business invitee thereon, stated in Rogalski v. Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 2 U2d 303, 282 P2d 304, 307, as "The duty 
owed by an owner of land to ·a business visitor is to inspect 
and maintain his premises in a reasonably safe condition ... ". 
Respondents were business invitees (R. 28, 41). Reasonableness 
varies with the circumstances and in this case the jury could 
properly consider the highly corrosive nature of the soot. 
It could also consider that prior damage of a similar nature 
had occurred (R. 227-230), which would give warning to 
appellant of the possibility of a recurrence which appellant 
should seek to avoid. It is conceded that respondents' proof 
of earlier damage was not conclusive as to whether the earlier 
damage was from an identical substance. The testimony of 
Mr. Winegar and Mr. Hatch (R. 227-231) however, would 
certainly raise an inference that the same substance was in-
volved. Appellant did nothing to rebut this inference or to 
distinguish between the substances. The damage to the Winegar 
and Hatch crops occurred in 1957. Mr. Kenney, appellant's 
chief witness, had testified before Mr. Hatch and Mr. Winegar 
testified, and had stated that he had been appellant's safety 
engineer for five years (R. 140), that he was "the first one 
that hears about anything of this nature," and that he had never 
received a similar claim (R. 153). Appellant paid the claims 
of Mr. Hatch and Mr. Winegar (R. 227-231). Mr. Kenney 
14 
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did not rebut the testimony of Mr. Hatch and Mr. Winegar 
as to the true cause of their injury, nor did he explain why he 
did not mention their claims. 
The jury might also have considered that appellant vol-
tuneered testimony only as to procedures, precautions and 
chemical contents of their "Units 1, 2 and 3," which were in 
appellant's south plant. It gave no evidence in regard to its 
procedures at its north plant, which was also using the subject 
flare (R. 217, 218). On this point it should be noted that 
Mr. Kenney had testified that only the south plant was feeding 
into the flare on June 17, 1958 (R. 144, 145, 161, 162, 223). 
Appellant's own operations superintendent (R. 203), Mr. 
Yeates, later admitted that on June 17, 1958, the north plant 
was also venting its wastes through the subject flare stack 
(R. 217-218). 
From these contradictions in regard to prior claims and 
use of the stack by the north plant, a fair inference could be 
drawn that Mr. Kenney was not completelY. reliable in any of 
his testimony. The jury could have considered this in regard 
to Mr. Kenney's other testimony, which was the base of ap-
pellant's case. 
Appellant introduced no jmpartial evidence as to standards 
of care in the industry as it might have been done. DeWeese vs. 
f. C. Penney Co., 120 U 31, 232 P2d 210. 
The jury found as a fact that appellant did release the 
corrosive soot from its subject .flare stack (R. 46). Appellant 
did not explain the occurrence, but denied it. The jury could 
have inferred from this that appellant was negligent in not 
detecting the presence of the corrosive in its system. 
15 
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The case being one where respondents had no knowledge 
as to what negligent acts appellant might have performed, 
respondents were by necessity required to point out defects in 
appellant's evidence in their effort to maintain the inference 
of negligence. This is a rather unsatisfactory method of proving 
a case, and is the reason that a doctrine allowing an inference 
of negligence is necessary. 
The applicable rules are, "Where there is uncertainty 
as to the existence of either negligence or contributory negli-
gence, the question is not one of law, but of fact, and to be 
settled by a jury; and this whether the uncertainty arises from 
a conflict in the testimony, or because, the facts, being undis-
puted, fair-minded men will honestly draw different conclusions 
from them." Linden vs. Anchor Mining Co., 20 U 134, 58 
P 355, 358. "The plaintiff having prevailed is entitled to have 
the evidence and every reasonable inference to be drawn there-
from viewed in the light most favorable to him." Webb v. 
Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 9 U2d, 275, 342 P2d 1094. 
"The usual purpose of the res ipsa loquitor doctrine is to 
establish a prima facie case of negligence when proof is not 
available as to what caused a mishap that ordinarily would 
not occur in the absence of negligence." Webb v. Olin Mathie-
son Chemical Corp., supra. 
Under the facts, and with the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom, respondents submit that the jury was not in 
error, as a matter of law, in finding the appellant negligent. 
16 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHIN ITS PROPER 
FIELD OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING APPELLANT'S 
INSTRUCTION NO.4 (1.6 of JIFU). 
(a) Appellant, at this point, is not in a position to argue 
the refusal of this instruction as appellant failed at the trial to 
submit the instruction in writing (R. 59, 244, 245) and gave 
no excuse for its failure to do so. Requiring instructions to the 
jury to be submitted in writing to the court, Rule 51, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, states: 
" * * * Any party may file written requests that the 
court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in said 
requests, * * * '' 
and there is no error if the court refuses to give a requested 
instruction not submitted in writing. Salt Lake and U. R. Co. 
t'. Schramm, 56 Utah 53, 189 Pac. 90, 92; Koutsis v. Zions 
Savings Bank & Trust Co., 63 Utah 254, 225 Pac. 339, 341. 
(b) In addition, appellant failed to state its ground of 
objection, after the court refused the instruction (R. 244), 
contrary to Rule 5l, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and this 
failure waives the objection. Employer's Mutual Liability In-
surance Co. v. Allen Oil Co., 123 Utah 253, 258 P.2d 445, 
450; Poole v. Southern Pacific Co., 20 Utah 210, 58 Pac. 326, 
333. 
(c) Accordingly, the appellant has failed, without cause, 
to conform to the Rules of Civil Procedure. They are to be 
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followed unless there is some persuasive reason to the contrary. 
McCall v. Kendrick, 2 U. 2d 364, 274 P.2d 962. 
(d) On the merits of the case, the trial court was within 
its discretion in refusing appellant's instruction No. 4, as such 
an instruction is not a matter of right and may be properly 
refused if the circumstances of the case indicate no necessity 
for it. Appellant concedes this point (Appellant's Brief, p. 28). 
See 19 C.J.S., Corporations, § 1340, p. 1056 and J. I. Case 
Threshing Machine Co. v. Dezzuti, 288 P. 1050, 1051, 87 
Colo. 479. 
The record of the case has no tears, widows, heartbreak 
or hardships on the part of respondents. There was no bodily 
injury nor pain. Damages were stipulated (R. 77, 248). There 
is no testimony in the record at all by respondents as to the 
effect on them of the subject injury. The trial record is com-
pletely barren of any testimony or circumstances which would 
excite the passions of the jury in favor of respondents, other 
than the mere fact that respondents are individuals and ap-
pellant is a corporation. 
The court's instructions Numbers 3 and 4 (R. 37, 38) 
cover the basic point which appellant desired, by reminding 
the jury to disregard outside influences and to strictly follow 
the law as given to it. Appellant's counsel, in argument to the 
jury, did, in fact, argue the content of his instruction No. 4, 
and its correctness as a general proposition was conceded 
by respondents' counsel on rebuttal. 
Respondents do not concede that the jury is a product of 
a welfare state, and suggest that, if the jury had any inclination 
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to consider outside factors, the jury might also consider the 
factors involved in the cost to them of corporate products. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents submit that the trial below was conducted 
fairly and without error, and that the judgment should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
K. SAMUEL KING 
Attorney for Respondents 
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